Do labor market distortions cause overvaluation and rigidity of the real exchange rate? by Lopez, Ramon & Riveros, Luis
Poddy,  Research,  and  External  Affairs  S
WORKING  PAPERS
Trade  Policy  I
Country  Economics  Department












Liberalization of the labor market would substantially  reduce or
prevent overvaluation of the real exchange rate.
ThePolicy. Reseatch. and External Affairs Complex  distributes PRE Working Papess  to disseminate the findings of work in progress and
to arcownge the exchange of ideas among Bank staff and all othas  inteested in development issues. These papers cary  tde names of
the authors, reflect only their views, and should be wed  and cted  accordingly. The findings, interpmetations,  and conclusions am the
















































































































dPcKResearch,  and  Exowndl  Affblrs 
=Tr~~Tade  Policy
WPS 485
This paper-  ajoint product of the Trade Policy Division and the Macroeconomic Adjustment and Growth
Division, Country Economics Department  - is part of a larger effort in PRE to identify the role of labor
markets in the process of economic adjustment in developing countries. Copies are available free from the
World Bank,  1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Raquel Luz, room NI 1-057,
extension 34303 (32 pages, including tables).
Lopez and Riveros developed a theoretical  They also found that changes in the mini-
model for analyzing the effect of labor markets  mum wage have substantially broader effects on
on the real exchange rate.  They applied an  an economy's wage structure than previously
empirical version of the model to four Latin  thought.
American countries with relatively different
labor markets and macroeconomic conditions.  In other words, liberalization of the labor
market could make exchange rate policies more
They found that distortions in the formal  cffective by preventing overvaluation of the real
labor market are a major factor causing real  exchange rate.
wage rigidity and the low responsiveness of the
real exchange rate to nominal devaluation.
The PRE Working  Paper  Series dissePinates the findings  of work  under  way in the Bankrs  Policy, Research,  and Extemal
Affairs  Complex.  An objective  of the  series is toget theserfidings  out  quickly,  even if presentations  are less than  fully  polished. The findings, interpretations,  and ronclusions  in these papers  do not necessarily  represent  official Bank policy.
Produced  by the PRE  Dissemination  CenterDo Labor  Market  Distortions  Cause  Overvaluation





Table  of  Contents
1.  Introduction  1
2.  The  Conceptual  Model  4
2.1  Wage  Determination  in  the  Formal  Sector  5
2.2  Wage  Determination  in  the  Informal  Sector  9
2.3  Determination  of  the  Price  of  Non-Tradables  11
3.  Comparative  Statics  f  the  Model  12
4.  Empirical  Estimation  15
5.  Conclusion  22
Tables  24
References  28
Data  Appendix  29
Comments  on an earlier  draft  by Bela  Balassa,  Sonia  Bhalotra,  Ed Buffie,
Arvind  Panagariya,  Claudia  Sepulveda,  and  James  Tybout,  as well  as the
able  research  assistance  of Larry  Bouton  and  Isidro  Scloaga,  are  deeply
acknowledged.  This  research  was  financed  by  the  Research  Committee  of
the World  Bank  (RPO 679-30).DO LABOR  MARKET  DISTORTIONS  CAUSE  OVERVALUATION  AND  RIGIDITY
OF  THE REAL EXCHANGE  RATE?
1.  Introduction
Many  developing  countries  have  a  tendency  toward  overvalued  exchange  rates.
Such  overvaluation  has  contributed  to serious  current  account  imbalances  that
nave necessitated  "structural  economic  adjustments." In turn, an important
component  of structural  adjustment  has  been  devaluation  of the  nominal  exchange
rate,  but the result  has been mixed in many cases.  In some countries,  the
responsiveness  of the real  exchange  rate to the  nominal  devaluation  has been
relatively  small. For  example,  for  14 devaluation  episodes  in Latin  America,
effectiveness  (measured  as the percentage  change in the real exchange  rate
divided  by the  percentage  change  in the  nominal  exchange  rate)  one  year  after
devaluation  was found  to  be  only  532,  substantially  lower  than  the  74? average
for  the  non-Latin  American  episodes  (Edwards  1988).
Both  the  tendency  to  overvalue  the  exchange  rate  and  the  low  responsiveness
of  the  teal  exchange  rate  to  a  nominal  devaluation  have  commonly  been  attributed
to  fiscal  and  monetary  imbalances  (Mussa  1986;  Barandiaran  1988).  If  real  fiscal
expenditures  and monetary balances  are  not  sufficiently  reduced after a
devaluation,  the  real  exchange  rate  is not likely  to depreciate  significantly
(Edwards  and  Ahmed,  1988).
While  in  no  way  diminishing  the  evident  importance  of fiscal  and  monetary
policies,  this  paper  focuses  on labor  market  distortions  as another  explanation
for  these  two  phenomena. Consider,  for  example,  a small  open  economy  in  which
the  only distortion  is a  mandated  minimum  wage and in  which  open  unemployment2
prevails.l/  An increase  tn  the  real  minimum  wage  will reduce  both  employment
and  real  income. The  supply  of  nontradables  will  fall  in  the  short  run  (assuming
that capital  is sector  specific). It will fall in the long run as well if
production  of  non  tradables  is  more  labor  intensive  than  production  of  tradables.
At  the same time, the fall in real income and the ensuing reduction in
expenditures  will reduce  the  demand  for  nontradables.  So  the  net  effect  on  the
real price  of nontradables  is ambiguous.  If the neg.ative  supply  effect is
strong,  the  price  of  nontradables  will  increase  and  hence,  the  real  exchange  rate
will appreciate.
This  appreciation  of the  exchange  rate  may imply  "overvaluation"  if  it is
associated  with  a  worsening  of  the  current  account. If  the  increase  in  the  real
minimum  wage is perceived  as temporary,  its  effect  on the  current  account  is
likely  to  be  negative.  The  fall  in  real  aggregate  expenditures  will  be  less  than
the  fall  in real  income  as  consumers  choose  to spread  the  implied  reduction  in
expenditures  over time.  Since  the  current  account  is the difference  between
aggregate  expenditures  and  income,  a  higher  real  minimum  wage  is  likely  to  cause
its  deterioration.  In  other  words,  a  current  account  imbalance  is  generated  that
is  caused  by real  forces  rather  than  by monetary  and  fiscal  policies.2/
In our example,  an increase  in the minimum  wage is likely to cause
overvaluation  of the  real  exchange  rate  and  external  imbalances,  but  would  not
affect  the  responsiveness  of the  real  exchange  rate  to a nominal  devaluation.
In  the  real  world,  however,  labor  market  distortions  are far  more complex  than
1/  See Dixit and Norman  (1980),  and Neary (1978)  for an analysis  of the
implications  of  economy-wide  wage  distortions  in  a  trade  model  with  money.
2/  Of course,  the  current  account  deficit  brings  about  the  well-known  self-
correcting  mechanisms  associated  with the  fall  in  foreign  reserves,  which
eventually  lead  to a realignment  of the exchange  rate.  The  problem  is
that  by the  time  this self-correcting  process  is completed,  the country
has lost  considerable  reserves  and/or  its  external  debt  has risen.3
an  economy-wide  mandated minimum wage.  In  many  developing countries,
unionization  and  government  intervention  are  responsible  for  greater  distortions.
This  intervention  normally  affects  wage setting  only  in  the  formal  sector  of  the
economy,  because the extreme atomization  of firms makes unionization  and
enforcemer'.  of government  regulation  very  difficult  in the  informal  sector.
In a  world in which  unions  and  the government  are  partly  responsive  to
market  conditions,  the  size  of the  wage distortion  that results  in the  formal
sector  (the  premium  between  the  actual  and  the  notional  or  market  clearing  wage)
may be endogenous  and dependent  on variables  such as relative  prices,  real
income,  and the like.  The premium  increases  with increasing  unions'  market
power,  but  it  does  not  necessarily  become  less  responsive  to  changes  in  market
conditions.  Whether  this  premium  becomes  Aess  sensitive  in  response  to  changes
in market  conditions  as labor  markets  become  more distorted  is an important
question.  The effectiveness  of a nominal  devaluation  as an instrument  for
inducing  a  real  devaluation  decreases  as  distortions  in  the  labor  market  increase
if,  as  a result,  the  wage  premium  becomes  less  responsive  to  market  conditions.
In considering  the  consequences  of labor  market  distortions  for  the  real
exchange  rate,  this  paper  explores  two  hypotheses: (1)  an increase  in labor
market  distortions  leads  to  an appreciation  of the  real  exchange  rate,  and (2)
labor  market  distortions  diminish  the  elasticity  of  response  of  the  real  exchange
rate  to a  nominal  devaluation.  We evaluate  the  quantitative  importance  of the
first  hypothesis  and  parametrically  test  the  second  hypothesis  for  the  case  of
four  Latin  American  countries,  namely,  Argentina,  Chile,  Colombia,  and  Uruguay.
In doing  this  we exploit  what is largely  an original  data  set  for  Labor  market
variables  constructed  from  primary  country  data  sources.
We first  present  the conceptual  model,  and then conduct  a comparative
static  analysis  to  help interpret  the  empirical  results. The  estimating  model4
and  re ilts  are  thien  discussed,  followed  by  the  major  conclusions.  Our  findings
generally  support  the  hypothesis  that istortions  in  the  formal  labor  market  are
a  major  factor  explaining  wage rigidity  and  the  relatively  small  responsiveness
of the  real  exchange  rate  to  a nominal  devaluation.
2.  The  Conceptual  Model
The  model  considers  two  sectors: (1)  the  formal  sector,  which  is subject
to  unionization  and  government  regulations  and  uses  both  skilled  and  unskilled
workers,  and (2)  the  informal  sector,  which  is  not subject  to unionization,  is
de facto  free  from  government  regulations  (including  the  minimum  w;ge)  and  uses
only  unskilled  workers. Because  of  the  distortions  in  the  formal  labor  market,
open  unemployment  prevails  among  skilled  workers. The  equilibrium  wage in  the
informal  sector  is assumed  to  be below  the  minimum  wage.  It is assumed  that
skilled  workers  do not accept  working  in the  informal  sector  for  a lower  wage
but  wait for  an opening  in the  formal  sector. In contrast,  unskilled  workers
mc.ve  between  the  sectors.  No distortions  exist  in  the  informal  sector  so  wages
are  fully  flexible. Since  unskilled  workers  unable  to find  a  job  in  the  formal
sector  at the  ongoing  minimum  wage  are  willing  to  work in  the  informal  sector,
there  is  no unemployment  among  unskilled  workers.3/
In  the  formal  sector,  the  wage rate  for  unskilled  workers  is  equal  to  the
minimum  wage rate  while the actual  wage for skilled  labor is assumed  to be
determined  by a premium  over a notional  or nmarket  clearing  wage.  The  model
allows  for  change  in this  premium  according  to existing  market  conditions  and
government  regulations. For  unskilled  labor,  the relationship  between  formal
3/  Open  unemployment  in  Latin  America  is largely  a  middle-class  phenomenon.
The typical  unemployed  person is relatively  well educated,  young and
dependent,  and  waiting  for  a  job  opening  in  the  formal  sector  (World  Bank
1988).5
and  informal  labor  markets  follows  Harberger  (1971): in  the  formal  sector,  the
demand curve for unskilled labor and the minimum wage together  determine
employment.  There  is an  effective  labor  supply  to the  informal  sector  that  is
less  than  the  total  supply  of  unskilled  labor  by the  amount  of  employment  in  the
formal  sector. The  market  equilibrium  between  labor  demand  from  the informal
sector  and the effective  labor  supply  to the informal  sector  determines  the
informal  sector  equilibrium  wage rate.
The  price  of  nontradables  is  assumed  to  be determined  by market  clearing
conditions,  while  the  price  of tradable  goods  is  determined  by the  world  price
times  the  nominal  effective  exchange  rate. The real  exchange  rate  is  thus  the
relative  price  of tradables  to nontradables. This economy,  then,  has three
endogenous  prices: the  actual  wage  for  skilled  workers,  the  wage for  unskilled
workers  in  the  informal  sector,  and  the  price  of non-tradables.  We shall  now,
in turn,  specify  the  determination  of each  of these  prices.
2.1  Wage  Determination  in  the  Formal  Sector
The formal market for skilled  workers cLn be characterized  by two
equations.  The  first  one  rorresponds  to  the  determination  of  the  notional  market
clearing  wage rate:
(1)  aO + a, ln  p - Q2 ln  w  -Q 3 ln  mw + a4 ln  t = a  N
The  left-side  is the  notional  demand  function  for  skilled  labor,  where  p is  the
price  of nontradable  goods,  w* is the  notional  market  clearing  wage rate  for
skilled  workers,  and  mw is  the  minimum  wage rate. Each of the  three  variables
is  normalized  by PT,  the  price  of tradables. The  variable  t represents  other6
factors  affecting  labor  demand  such  as  the  capital  stock,  technical  change,  etc.
The right-side  of the equation  corresponds  to the (fixed)  supply  of skilled
labor,  where  N is  the  labor  force,  and  0  <  #  < 1  is  a  coefficient  indicating  that
the  supply  of  skilled  workers  in  the  short-runi  is  a  fixed  proportion  of  the  labor
force. All  the  ai  coefficients  are  assumed  to  be  positive. Th?  notional  demand
for  skilled  labor  is increasing  in p and  t, and  decreasing  4n w* and  mw.  The
negative effect of mw on the demand for skilled workers reflects  gross
complementarity  between  skilled  and  unskilled  labor  in  the  formal  sector.
The second  equation  corresponds  to the  determination  of the  actual  wage
rate for skilled  workers.  This  wage is assumed  to be equal to the  notional
market  clearing  wage  rate  plus  a  variable  premium  reflecting  union  and  government
intervention.  Thus,  the  actual  wage rate  for  skilled  labor  (w)  is
(2a) ln  w =  ln  w* +  T(w*,  mw, 0)  ,
where r(O) is the  variable  mark-up  or premium,  which depends  on the  notional
(equilibrium)  wage (w*),  the  minimum  wage (mw)  and  6  >  0,  a  variable  reflecting
other  labor  market  distortions  that  affect  the  market  for  skilled  labor. It  can
be shown  that  equation  (2a)  is consistent  with a model  of oligopolistic  trade
unions  where  each  union  maximizes  a quadratic  utility  function  having  w/w* and
the  union's  membership  as  arguments  subject  to  an  aggregate  labor  dema'd  curve.
In this  case,  the  variable  0  has  a natural  interpretation  which  is  t.ie  average
degree  of  market  power  of the  various  unions.41 This  specification  is i.a  turn
4/  It is assumed  that there  are N labor  unions  in the  various  industries.
Union  i maximizes  a utility  function  U[w/w  ,  Li] subject  to an inverse
labor  demand  function  w =  w(L, p, mw).  The first  orier  conditions  are
derived for each union allowing  for non-zero  conjectural  variations.
Adding  up  the  first  order  conditions  for  all  the  unions,  assuming  that  the
quadratic  utility  has  no inter  active  terms  between  w/w* and  Li and  that7
a generalization  of the fixed  mark-up  case derived  from  a monopolistic  trade
union  model  by Calvo  (1978).
We specify  the  following  function  for  the  mark-up
(2b) w( )  -G  * (co  + el ln  w  +  e2 ln  mv) .
Thus,  combining  2a  and  &.b  we obtain  an expression  for  the  actual  formal  sector
wage rate  for  skilled  labor:
(2c) ln  w - ln  w* + 0 * (co  +  el ln  w* +  62 ln  mwv)
All ei (i=0,...2)  coefficients  are  fixed. It is assumed  that  cO  >  0: (Co  +  e1
ln  w* +  el ln  mw) >  0; 62 >  0; the sign  of el is not  a priori  determined;  and
Eel  >  -1. The  latter  condition  implies  that  an expansior.  of  labor  demand  (and,
hence,  a  reduction  in  unemployment)  will  necessarily  lead  to  higher  notional  and
actual  wages.  That is,  specification  2c implicitly  allows  for  a relationship
between  real  wages  and  unemployment.5/
Specification  2c  has  several  interesting  features: if  9  - 0 (i.e.,  there
are  no labor  market  distortions  affecting  th'  skilled  labor  market)6/  then  w -
w*;  that  is,  the  actual  wage  rate  will  coincide  with  the  equilibrium  wage rate.
it  is  identical  across  unions  one  can  derive  an expression  for  the  wage
equation  such  as  2a. The  variable  9  is  the  weighted  average  of  the  unions'
conjectural  variations  u3ing  as  weights  the  share  in total  employment  of
each  union's  employment  level.
5/  Also  note  that  by including  w* as  a  determinant  of the  wage  premium  we are
implicitly  allowing  for this premium  to be dependent  on the level  of
unemployment.  As  the market clearing  wage falls, ceteris paribus,
unemployment  increases.
6/  It is assumed  that the  minimum  wage is  below  the  notional  wage rate  for
skilled  workers.8
Second,  the  actual  wage  rate  is  increasing  in  w* and  0;  that  is,  the  actual  wage
rate  is responsive  to  changes  in  market  conditiens  (reflected  by changes  in  w*)
and increases  as the distortion  6 increases. Third,  the sensitivity  of the
actual  wage  rate  to  changes  in  the  notional  wage  rate  w*  is  afxected  by  the  level
of the  distortion  9. The  effect  of 9  on the  responsiveness  of  w to changes  in
w* depends  critically  on the parameter  E1.7/  If ei > O, w  becomes  more
responsive  as labor  markets  distortions  increase;  el  =  0 implies  no effect;  and
el <  0 signifies  that w become  more rigid  as the labor  market distortions
increase.  And finally, if e1  =  e2  =  0. equ..tion  2 collapses into  w =  e  w
in  which  case the  markup  is fixed  and  proportional  to the level  of distortion
S. This  is  a special  case  in  which  the  markup  is  effectively  independent  of  the
demand  conditions  that  determine  the  value  of  w*.
Note that the specification  2c implies  that unions  maximize  a utility
function  dependent  on the  proportional  rent  represented  by the  ratio  of actual
to  notional  wages  as  well as on the  level  of union  employment. The  advantage
of using  the  proportional  rent  specification  is that  it is  valid  for  any  wage
deflator  provided  both  w and  w* are  deflated  by the same  price.  Hence  this
makes  the  distinction  between  "consumption"  and  "production"  wages  unnecessary.
Including  the  minimum  wage in the markup  represents  the idea that the
minimum  wage signals  to  wage negotiators  the  degree  of support  the  government
provides  to  workers.  So an increase  in the  minimum  wage, even if it is  much
lower than the actual  wage paid to skilled  workers, is a positive  signal
encouraging  labor  organizations  to  be  more  demanding.  If  this  signalling  effect
is important,  we would  expect  E2 >  0.
7/  From expression  2b one  obtains  8ln  w/Oln  w* =  1 + 0  el,  where the left
hand  side  is  interpreted  as  the  responsivenes  of  actual  to  notional  wages.
Hence  this  responsiveness  is  affected  by  6,  the  level  of  this  effect  being
equal  to el.9
Using equation  2-, we can express  equation  1 in terms of observable
variables  as follows:
(3a: ln  w - Ao +  Al9 +  A2 ln  p +  A3 9  ln p +  A4 ln  mw +  A5 9  ln  mw
+  A6N +  A7 ON +  A8 ln  t  +  Ag O ln t
wnere  Ao - a2  A1 0  LO  (El +  CO  +  E2 ] @t2  @t2
-2  m al  A3 = a2  el A2 1  @1
as  @33  @4
A  @2  A5 =  E2  - a2  El  A8  5  '-
AsA  =  - /  A=  E1  Ag = a4 El A 6 - @2  A7=- --
This ret  of coefficients  allows  us to determine  the  values  of eo,  el, and  62
using the estimated Ai (i =  0, ... 9) coefficients.  For example, the value of
the coefficient  e1 =  A3/A 2 and its standard  error  can be estimated  from the
standard  errors  and  covariances  of  A3 and  A2 (Kendall  and  Stuart,  1977).  We  note
that  not  all  coefficients  in  equation  (3a)  are  independent.  In  particular,  the
structural  model (equations  1  and  2)  suggests  that  A7/A6 = A3/A2 = A9/A 8. This
restriction  is used in estimating  the  model  and is statistically  tested  using
non-linear  methods.
2.2  Wage  Determination  in  the  Informal  Sector
In contrast  with the labor  market  for skilled  workers,  the market  for
unskilled  labor  is  assumed  to  be  1e-manently  in  equilibrium,  and  the  supply  of
unskilled  workers  is  assumed  to  be elastic,10
(4a) Po  +  plln p -P21n wu  - p31n  mw +  p41n  w +  P5 ln t  =  00 +  01 ln  WU
02 in  p + 03 N
where the left-side  represents  the total demand (from  both the formal  and
informal  sectors)  for  unskilled  workers  and  the  right-side  is  the  supply. The
variable  wu is the  wage rate for unskilled  workers in the informal  sector
normalized  by the  price  of tradables  and  wu is the 'consumption"  wage defined
as  Wu/pTb  PNb where  b is  the  share  of  tradable  goods  in  the  consumption  deflator
of  unskilled  workers  and  Wu is  the  nominal  wage  for  unskilled  labor. Since  the
minimum  wage  is  enforced  in  the  formal  sector,  demand  for  unskilled  labor  in  this
sector  is  determined  largely  by the  level  of the  minimum  wage.  In  the  informal
sector,  however,  the minimum  wage is not enforced  and so the wage rate of
unskilled  workers  in this  sector,  wu,  adjusts  to  clear  the  market. The  supply
of  unskilled  workers  is  assumed  to  be elastic  (01  > 0 is  probably  quite  large)
and  dependent  oni  the  total  size  of the  labor  force  N.8/
Using  the  definition  of  the  "consumption"  wage  wu,  we can  rewrite  equation
(4a) as,
(4b) Po  + [pi - 01 (b-1)]  ln  P - P 2 ln  wu - P3 ln  mw +  4 ln  w
+  P5  ln t  - gO  +  fl ln  vu - 02 in  p +  03 N
From 4b we obtain  the  following  specification  for  the  wage rate  of unskilled
workers:
8/  Note  that  one  can  also  allow  mw to affect  the  supply  of unskilled  labor.
However,  this  does  not  change  the  estimating,  reduced-form  specifications.11
(5)  ln  wu  Bo  + B1 ln  p + B2 ln  w + B3 ln  mw + B4 N  + B5 ln  t
PO  - 10  Pl  +  n2  o  Al  (b-i)
where  °0  P2 +  l  =  1  2  +  1l
P4 p3 3 B=  B  - B
2  3  p2 l  3B  P  =  _  a4  _2Ey.
P 5
B5  =p2  + Al 
Of course,  the structural  parameters  of equation  4 cannot  be determined  from
equation  5.
2.3  Determination  of the  Price  of Non-Tradables
Finally,  the  market  for  nontradables  is  also  assumed  to  be in  equilibrium,
(6)  70 +  71  ln p - 72 ln  w - 73 ln  mw - 74 ln  wu +  75 ln t
=  zo - z1 ln p +  z2 ln(E/PT)
where  E is nominal  absorption  and  PT =  ep*,  where  e is the effective  nominal
exchange  rate  and  p* is  the  world  price  of  tradables.  The  left-side  of  equation
6 represents  supply,  and  the right-side  the  demand  for  nontradables. That  we
control  for  absorption  in  equation  6  means  that  the  parameters  will  reflect  the
pure  effect  of  labor  market  factors  and  exclude  the  indirect  effects  taking  place
via  the  adjustments  in  absorption  induced  by  changes  in  labor  market  conditions.
Of  course,  in  the  estimation  we recognize  the  endogenous  character  of  absorption
by using  the  instrumental  variables  technique.12
We can thus obtain from (6) an equation  for the relative  price of
nontradables  (the  inverse  of the  real  exchange  rate),  i.e.,
(7)  ln p =  CO  +  C1 ln w +  C2 In  mw +  C3 ln wu  +  C4 In(E/pT) +  c5 ln t,
where  C  =z  701  7 2
0=  73  C=  74
2  71  +  zl  3  7i + Z1
z2  75
c4  71  +  z,71  1  =  z1
3.  Comparative  Statics  of the  Model
Equations  1 to 7 can  be used to  determine  to  what extent  distortions  in
the  formal  labor  market  may reduce  the  effect  of a nominal  devaluation  on the
real  exchange  rate.  In particular,  we are  interested  in  how the  effect  of PT
on p is affected  by the  level  of G. Totally  differentiating  equation  7  with
respect  to  PT  and  explicitly  accounting  for  changes  in  w and  Wu using  equations
3a and  5 yields:
(8a)  dnp  - 04C  -AB  - dln  PT  1  - A20 1 - B1C3 - A2B2C3 - A3e (Cl  +  C3B 2)  °0
Expression  8a  measures  the  effect  of  a  nominal  devaluation  on  the  (inverse)
real  exchange  rate.  The sign of expression  8a is negative  given  that  C4 is
positive  and that stability  requires  that  the denominator  be positive. This
expression  clearly  shows  that  the  impact  of a  change  in  PT on the  real  exchange
rate  is  affected  by the  extent  of  distortions  in  the  formal  sector  (measured  by13
the  size  of  0). From  8a  we can  derive  the  effect  of  9  on  the  responsiveness  of
the  real  exchange  rate  to devaluation,
dln (dln  p/dln  PT)  A30 (C 1 + C3 B2)
(8b)  ~dln  9  H
where  H >  0 is the  expression  in  the  denominator  in  equation  (8a).
Given  (C 1 + C3B2) > 0,  the  effect  of  9  on the  value  of  equation  8a  depends
crucially  on the  sign  of  A3, which  itself  is  equal  to  the sign  of el (from  the
definition  of A3 in equation  3).  So, if el >  0, the effectiveness  of a
devaluation  increases  with 9;  if  el  =  0,  the  degree  of labor  market  distortion
has  no influence  on  the  effectiveness  of  a  devaluation;  and  if  el  <  0,  the  effect
of a nominal  devaluation  declines  with the size  of 9.  Intuitively,  one  might
expect  labor  market distortions  to affect  not only the level  but also the
flexibility  of real  wages in response  to changes  in market conditions. If
distortions  cause  real  wages  in  the  formal  sector  to  become  more  rigid,  then  the
real  price  of  nontradables  will  also  become  more  rigid  and  the  real  exchange  rate
would  be less  responsive  to  a  nominal  devaluation.
The  effect  of labor  market  distortions  on the  level  of the  real  exchange
rate  can  be obtained  by totally  differentiating  equations  3, 5,  and 7,
dln  p  1
(9)  da=O  H [(A 1+  A3 ln p +  A5 ln  mw + a7 N +  Ag  ln t) (C 1 + C3 B2)] >  0
The sign  of expression  9 depends  on the  numerator,  which is simply  the  effect
of 9 on the  wage rate  of skilled  workers. This effect  is obviously  positive.
Accordingly,  a lessening  of  labor  market  distortions  in  the  formal  sector  causes
a  depreciation  in  the  real  exchange  rate. Based  on the  estimated  coefficients,14
equation  9  provides  an  expression  to  measure  the  quantitative  importance  of the
effect  of  distortions  in  the  skilled  labor  market  on  the  (inverse)  real  exchange
rate.
Similarly,  by differentiating  the system  of equations  3, 5, and 7  with
respect  to ln  p  and  ln  mw we can  obtain  the  effect  on the  real  exchange  rate  of
a  change  in the  minimum  wage,
dln  p  1
(10) dln  mw  H  jC2  + Cl (A 5 0  +  A 4) +  C3 (B 3 + (A5 + A 4) B2)] >  0
Raising  the  real  minimum  wage  leads  to  an  appreciation  of  the  real  exchange  rate.
The  unambiguity  of  expression  10  arises  from  the  fact  that  aggregate  expenditures
(E/PT)  are  taken  as  given. Thus,  expression  10  captures  only  the  supply  effects
on  nontradables  associated  with  the  direct  effects  of  higher  minimum  wages  plus
the  two  indirect  effects  via  higher  wages  for  both  skilled  and  unskilled  labor.
All these  effects  point  toward  a decrease  in the  supply  of  nontradables  and  so
to an increase  in their  price.  If one allows  for endogenous  expenditures,
however,  the  effect  becomes  indeterminate  if the  higher  mirimum  wage leads  to
a  decrease  in  real  income  and,  hence,  of  expenditures.  Expressions  8a  and  9  are
also  obtained  for  constant  absorption. The  interpretationI  of expressions  8a,
9,  and  10  would  then  be the  effect  of a  devaluation,  changes  in  9,  and  a  change
in  mw,  respectively,  on the  real  exchange  rate  when the  government  uses  fiscal
and  monetary  instruments  to  keep  absorption  constant. This  is  consistent  with
the major objective  of this paper,  which is to isolate  the role of labor
characteristics  in  determining  the  effect  of devaluation.15
4.  Empirical  Estimation
The  theoretical  model  implies  a  nonlinear  restriction  on the  coefficients
of  equation  3a (i.e.,  A7/A6 = A3/A2 - Ag/A 8).  A nonlinear  method  of estimation
is  thus  needed  to  test  for  this  restriction.  The  restricted  form  of  the  equation
for  skilled  wages  is the  following:
(3b) ln w=  AO +  A1 +  A2 ln  p + (A 261) G ln  p + A4 ln  mw
+ (C2  + A4 C1) Oln mw + A6 N + (A6 61)  ON + A8 ln t +  (A 8 61) G  ln t
Equation  3b incorporates  the  restrictions  that  A3 = A261, A7 =  A6fl and  Ag = A8
El  as  well  as  the  definition  A5 = 62  +  A4El. This  allows  us  to  directly  estimate
the  key structural  parameters  el and  e2 and their  respective  standard  errors.
We  proceed  by first  estimating  the  unrestricted  form  (equation  3a)  using  linear
two-stage  least  squares  and  then  estimating  the  restricted  form  by  a  non-linear
two  stage  least  square  method  using  the  parameters  of the  unrestricted  form  as
initial  values.
Apart  from  the  restriction  presented  above,  the  theoretical  model  implies
sign  restrictions  on the  estimating  parameters  that  are  empirically  verified:
A2 > 0,  A3 < 0 (if el < 0),  A4 < 0,  A5 > 0 (if  e2 >  0,  el < 0),  A6 < 0, and A7
> 0 (if  el < 0),  A8 > 0  and a9 < 0 (if  el < 0),  while AO and  A1 have unrestricted
signs.  Furthermore,  the  expected  sign  pattern  of  the  other  estimating  equations
is the following:  B1, B2 > 0; B3, B4 < 0; B5 > 0; C1, C2, C3, C4 > 0; C5 < 0;
and  Bo,  CO are  unrestricted.  The  estimation  procedure  also  uses instrumental
variables  to  account  for  the  possible  endogeneity  of  the  variable  G  in  equations
3a  and  3b and  of the  variable  absorption  (E/pT)  in  equation  (7).16
Data
Equations  3a (or  3b),  5, and 7  were estimated  separately  for  Argentina,
Chile,  and  Colombia  using  annual  data  for  1960-85,  and  for  Uruguay  using  data
for  1965-85.  Most  of the  labor  market  data  used  are  original,  constructed  from
primary  aata sources  in each country.S'  Wages in the informal  sector  were
proxied  b)  the  average  observed  hourly  income  of self-employed  workers  with  less
than  eight  years  of schooling.101  Wages  of skilled  labor  were  measured  by the
average  wage  of  salaried  blue-collar  and  white-collar  workers  in  firms  employing
more  than  ten  workers. Official  statistics  were  used for  the  minimum  wage and
size  of  the  labor  force. The  inverse  real  exchange  rate  (p)  was  defined  as the
ratio  between  the  price  index  of  nontradables  and  tradables. The  price  series
were constructed  using  corresponding  price  deflators  from  national  accounts.
Agriculture,  mining, and manufacturing  were considered  tradables;  services,
construction,  and  utilities  were considered  nontradables. The variable  e  is
not  directly  observable  and  thus  we are forced  to use  an empirical  proxy. We
use  the  level  of observed  real  nonwage  labor  costs  per  worker  in firms  with 10
or  more  workers  (costs  associated  with payroll  taxes  including  bonuses,  fringe
benefits,  and  other  contributions  to shared  funds).
Nonwage  labor  costs  were  used  as  a  proxy  for  labor  market  distortions  other
than  the  minimum  wage because  both  government  regulations  and labor  unions  in
the countries  being considered  have emphasized  nonwage  benefits  as a prime
target. For  instance,  in  Argentina  and  Colombia,  periods  of  more  active  union
or  government  intervention  have  been  characterized  by  higher  non-wage  payments;
9/  See  appendix  for  a documentation  of the  data  set  and  for  a description  of
the  historical  experience  of the  four  countries  considered.
10/  This  proxy  is a suitable  one in considering  that  the informal  sector  in
LDCs consists  fundamentally  of very small  firms,  usually  of the family-
type,  employing  relatively  unskilled  labor.17
on  the contrary, under a military-conservative  regime, Chile suffered a
significant  decline in non-wage  benefits  during  the 19708.  Responding  to
pressures  from  unions  and  other  influential  coalitions,  governments  have  at  times
expanded  severance  payments  and  other  benefits  --  and,  in  the  process,  increased
acceptance  for  these  policies  by casting  them  as a concern  for  worker  welfare.
From the side  of union's  objectives,  non-wage  benefits  are also considered  a
key  variable  in  wage bargaining. The  emphasis  of unions  on non-wage  benefits
derives in part from the non-taxable  status  that these benefits  normally
enjoy.-i/
The validity  of using nonwage benefits  as a proxy for labor market
distortions  is  supported  by  a  detailed  study  of twenty  developing  countries  that
found  nonwage  benefits  to  be  positively  related  to  other  qualitative  indicators
of labor  market  distortions  (Riveros  1989). Countries  in  which  nonwage  costs
were a small  part  of total  labor  costs (in  1985)  were also  generally  regarded
as  having  little  government  or  union  intervention,  such  as  Chile  (252),  Hong  Kong
(20Z),  Korea  (202),  and  Singapore  (352).  By  contrast,  the  share  of  nonwage  costs
were  high  in  interventionistslunionized  countries  such  as  Argentina  (46Z),  Mexico
(45Z),  and  Brazil  (38Z).
A possible  objection  to using  labor  market  distortions  as an explanatory
variable  is that  this  is  a structural  feature  of an economy  unlikely  to change
significantly. Fortunately,  this is not the case for the countries  under
consideration,  mainly  due to the frequent  institutional  and  political  changes
11/  Non-wage  benefits  are  nontaxable  in  all  four  countries  considered,  and  this
tax  status  did  not  change  throughout  the  period. Therefore,  the  observed
variability  in  9 through  time  cannot  be attributed  to  changes  in the  tax
laws.18
that  have  taken  place  throughout  the  period  under  analysis.12/  This  allows  us
to be confident  that the important  variability  of real non-wage  labor cost
represents  meaningful  changes  of  distortions  affecting  the  formal  sector.
Estimates
The  econometric  estimates  for  the  restricted  and  unrestricted  versions  of
the equation  for the  wage rate of skilled  workers  are presented  in Table  1,
estimates  of the equation  for unskilled  workers  are shown in Table 2, and
estimates  of  the  price  equation  are  presented  in  Table  3.  The  results  in  Table
1 exclude  the  variable  t.  This  variable  was supposed  to account  for  the  role
of other  factors  on labor  demand,  such as capital  and technological  change.
Suitable  capital  stock series  for the countries  under consideration  are  not
available  and  thus  we used  a  time  trend  variable.  Unfortunately,  the  parameters
associated  with  this  variable  were  not  statistically  significant.  A reason  for
this  is that  the  dependent  variables  do  not exhibit  any  defined  trend  through
time  due to the relatively  high degree  of instability  that  characterized  the
countries  during  most  of the  period  under  analysis.
The  goodness  of  fit  of  the  four  estimated  equations  is  highly  satisfactory
for all the countries,  as shown  by the high t-statistic  values and other
statistical  measures. Some equations  showed  first-order  autocorrelation,  for
12/  In the case of Chile, for example,  ir.  the early 60s a conservative
government  gave  little  support  to  unions  which  is  reflected  in  a  relatively
low level  of non-wage  benefits.  In the second  half of the 60s a new
government  took power, followed in 1970 by a  three-year  socialist
experiment. In  this  period  non-wage  benefits  showed  a continuous  upward
trend  peaking in 1972.  The next three-year  period shows a dramatic
reduction  in the index  of non-wage  costs  that  coincides  with the  early
years  of a right  wing  military  regime. After  1978  until  1982  there  is  a
gradual  improvement  of this  index  associated  with  new labor  lagislation
that reestablished  some  of the labor  protection  rules  and that imposed
backward  wage indexation.19
which we made the necessary  corrections. We also tested for second  order
autocorrelation  using  Box-Pierce  statistics,  and  in all  cases  could  not  reject
the hypothesis  of no second-order  autocorrelation.  We used a Chow test to
determine  whether  any  structural  changes  affected  the  parameter  values  throughout
the sample  period. We segmented  our samples  into subperiods  on the  basis  of
information  on  institutional  changes  and  on  major  changes  in  the  economic  regime
during  the  sample  period.13/  In  all  cases,  the  Chow  test  allowed  us  to  conclude
that  the  parameters  were stable  during  the  period.
The sign  pattern  of the  estimated  coefficients  is  highly  consistent  with
the  expected  signs  derived  from  the  theoretical  model  for  three  of  the  countries
--  Colombia,  Chile,  and  Uruguay.  All  the  statistically  significant  coefficients
estimated  for  these  countries  have  the  expected  signs. The  coefficients  that
were  not statistically  significant  and  that  had the "wrong"  signs  were B3 and
B4 for  Colombia,  C1 for  Chile,  and  A4, B4, and  C3 for  Uruguay. The  estimates
for  Argentina  are  substantially  less  consistent  with  the  theoretical  model,  with
three  coefficients  having  signif  :ant  values  but  wrong  signs. These  are  A2, A4,
and  C4 in  the  restricted  model. The  results  are  presented  nonetheless  so  that
the  reader  can  get  an  unbiased  report  on the  empirical  relevance  of the  model.
Among  the  possible  reasons  for  this  lack  of consistency  for  Argentina  are  the
following: Argentina  suffered  severe  macroeconomic  shocks  and rel:tive  price
instability  during  the sample  period  to a much greater  extent  than the  other
countries.  Such  an  economic  environment  may  be  expected  to  make  economic  agents
deviate  from  expected  patterns  and  it  increases  the  difficulties  of  constructing
a  consistent  time  series  data  set.
13/  In the  case  of  Chile,  for  example,  we tested  for  structural  change  during
the  conservative  military  regime  (1974-85),  in  Colombia  during  the  coffee
boom (1975-80),  in Argentina  and Uruguay for the periods of military
government  (1974-1983  and  1973-1982  respectively).20
The  restriction  on  the  coefficients  of  the  skilled  wage  equation  (equation
3b)  suggested  by the  theoretical  model  was tested  using  a  Wald test. The  Chi-
squared  value  of this  test  suggests  that  the  restriction  cannot  be rejected  at
any reasonable  level  of significance  in the  cases  of Argentina,  Colombia,  and
Uruguay. For  Chile,  the  restriction  is rejected  even though  the  unrestricted
estimates  come  close  to satisfying  the  theoretical  restriction. 14 1
The structural  parameters  el and  e2 are  estimatee5  from the restricted
version  of  the  skilled  wage  equation. There  is  a  high  degree  of  consistency  on
the signs  of these  coefficients  among  the  four  countries, The sign  of el is
negative  in all cases and, according  to the estimated  asymptotic  variance,
significantly  different  from  zero  in  Argentina,  Chile,  and  Uruguay. This  result
suggests  that in these countries  the wages of skilled labor become less
responsive  to  market  conditions  as the  labor  market  becomes  more  distorted.  In
other  words,  increased  government  and  union  intervention  not  only  pushes  wages
up (by  increasing  the  markup)  but  also  makes  the  wage level  less  responsive  to
changes  in  market  conditions.151  Only  in  Colombia  is  wage rigidity  not  affected
by labor  market  distortions.
It is important  to indicate  that this wage rigidity  effect is not
necessarily  associated  with  government-imposed  wage  indexation.  We allowed  for
the  coefficient  el  to change  during  periods  of official  wage indexation  using
a dummy  variable. The  coefficient  of the  dur-y  variable  was never  significant
in any  of the  countries  suggesting  that  we are  not  measuring  the  obvious  wage
rigidity  effect  generated  by direct  government-imposed  indexation.
141  We  nonetheless  use  the  parameters  of  the  restricted  version  in  the  ensuing
analysis  for  Chile  as  well as for  the  other  three  countries.
15/  The  estimates  permit  us to calculate  the  value  of the  markup  on the  bais
of  equation  2b. Evaluated  at average  values  of the  variables,  this  mark-
up fluctuates  between  23 percent  for  Chile  and  69 percent  for  Argentina.21
The coefficient  e2 is consistently  positive  for  all countries,  and its
significance  is high for Argentina,  Colombia,  and Chile and borderline  for
Uruguay. This  result  implies  that  adjustments  in  the  minimum  wage  have  effects
well  beyond  the  relatively  small  segment  of  the  labor  force  for  which  the  minimum
wage  is  binding. The  signalling  effect  of  minimum  wages  thus  appears  to  be  very
important  for  wage negotiators  in  the  formal  sector.
These  results  have  important  implications  for  the  exchange  rate, First,
in  all  the  countries, except Colombia, increased government and  union
intervention  in  the  formal  sector  labor  market  decreases  the  ability  of  a  nominal
devaluation  (with  constant  money  expenditures)  to generate  a real  devaluation.
Table  4 shows  the  effects  of changes  in 0  on the  effectiveness  of devaluation,
calculated  using  equation  (8b)  with  the  estimated  parameters.  The  largest  effect
occurs  in  Uruguay  and  Chile,  where  a 10?  increase  in 0 leads  to a decrease  in
the  effectiveness  of  devaluation  (measured  as  the  percentage  change  in  the  real
exchange  rate  divided  by the  percentage  change  in the  nominal  exchange  rate)  by
7.62 and 5.82 respectively  when evaluated  at mean values.  For  Argentina  the
effect  is smaller  and  for  Colombia,  consistently  with the  lack  of significance
of the  El  coefficient,  the  effect  is  almost  negligible.  It is interesting  that
the  two  countries  where  the  effectiveness  of devaluation  is  most  affected  by  0
are  precisely  those  that  exhibit  relatively  milder  distortions  in the formal
labor market.  This might suggest  that the marginal  effect of increasing
distortions  in labor  markets  already  highly  distorted  are  of little  importance
for  the  effectiveness  of  devaluation  but  that  even  small  increases  of  distortion
in labor  markets  initially  subject  to a low level  of distortions  can  be very
significant.
Second, increasing  real minimum  wages cause a  substan  .1  greater
appreciation  effect  on the real exchange  rate than previously  --. t.  For22
example,  using  equation  10  evaluated  at the  mean  value  of  9,  we find  that  a 10-
percent  increase  in  the  minimum  wage (without  a  nominal  devaluation)  causes  the
real  exchange  rate  to appreciate  1 percent  in Chile,  0.4  percent  in Colombia,
and  2.8  percent  in  ULJguay  (Table  5).  The estimates  for  Argentina  in  Table  5
give  wrong signs.  This is due to the  sign  problems  for several  coefficients
discussed  earlier.  Note that increasing  minimum  wage causes the greatest
appreciation  of  the  real  exchange  rate  in  Chile  and  Uruguay,  countries  where  the
real  minimum  wage level  is  lower  than  in  Argentina  and  Colombia.
In summary,  the  estimates  for  three  of the four  countries  analyzed  are
highly  consistent  with  the  theoretical  model  presented  in  section  2. One  should
note,  however,  that  the results  of the comparative  static  experiments  on the
exchange  rate  are  obtained  by controlling  for  domestic  absorption.  Changes  in
minimum  wages  and  distortions  affecting  the  skilled  labor  market  are  likely  to
also  affect  absorption.  Consideration  of  this  latter  effect  may  thus  affect  the
quantitative  significance  of the  results  reported  in  this  paper.
5.  Conclusion
The  main  objective  of this  paper  was to  measure  the  importance  of labor
market  distortions  in explaining  the marked tendency  to real exchange  rate
overvaluation  and the relatively  low effectiveness  of devaluation  in Latin
America. To do so,  we developed  an empirical  model  for  analyzing  the  role  of
labor  markets  in the  determination  of the  real  exchange  rate.  This  model  was
applied to four Latin American countries displaying  relatively  different
macroeconomic  and  labor  market  conditions.
The  n,ain  finding  is  that  distortions  in  the  formal  labor  market  are  a  major
factor  explaining  wage rigidity  and  the  diminished  responsiveness  of the real
exchange  rate  to devaluation. The  implication  is that  greater  liberalization23
of the labor  market  can substantially  improve  the efficacy  of exchange  rate
policies in preventing  overvaluation  of the real exchange rate.  Another
important  finding  is  that  changes  in  the  minimum  wage  have  substantially  broader
effects  on  the  wage structure  of the  economy  than  previously  thought. This,  in
turn,  implies  that continuous  increases  in the  minimum  wage are an important
factor  underlying  the  observed  tendencies  to  overvaluation  of  the  exchange  rate
in  Latin  America.
In summary,  we have,  to the  best of our  knowledge,  presented  the first
parametric  testing  of  two  hypotheses  that  have  been  a  source  of  continuous  debate
among  policy  analysts,  namely,  that  labor  market  distortions  cause  wage  and  real
exchange  rate rigidity  and that increases  in minimum  wages tend to push the
entire  wage structure  upwards. Our  findings  generally  support  both  hypotheses.24
Table  1: NL2SLS Estimates  of  the  Skilled  Wage  Equation
Argentina  (1960-86)  Colombia (1960-85)  Chile  (1960-85)  Uruguay  (1965-85)
Rostricted8  Unrestrict.db  Restrict.dO  Unr.strictedb  Restricted
5 Unrestrictedb  Restricteda  Unrestrictedb
AO (Constant)  2.558  0.589  -2.344  -3.730  0.007  -6.348  0.146  1.710
(2.653)  (0.834)  (-2.788)  (-2.631)  (1.171)  (-1.600)  (0.207)  (1.000)
Al  (6)  -3.337  -0.804  -0.411  1.180  1.808  1.913  0.108  -1.100
(-2.423)  (-0.7S5)  (-0.578)  (0.778)  (1.771)  (C.761)  (0.363)  (-0.918)
A2  (In  p)  -4.781  -1.084  3.961  (5.60)  7.387  9.932  2.192  0.071
(-2.311)  (-0.618)  (4.038)  (3.199)  (3.047)  (1.717)  (2.032)  (0.030)
Ag  (0  In  p)  --  2.188  --  -2.560  -3.064  --  0.424
(1.006)  (-1.218)  (-O.888)  (0.310)
A4 (In  iw)  4.759  2.401  -0.488  -0.724  -0.885  -2.122  0.609  1.900
(2.802)  (2.015)  (-2.518)  (-2.472)  (-1.323)  (-1.328)  (0.645)  (1.132)
AS (0  In  iw)  --  -2.410  --  1.123  --  0.8S3  --  -0.744
(-1.SS7)  (2.049)  (0.972)  (-0.825)
AS (N)  -1.226  -0.826  -0.087  -0.160  -0.803  -0.636  -1.934  -2.695
(-2.982)  (-3.457)  (-2.461)  (-2.204)  (-4.283)  (-1.703)  (-3.187)  (-2.610)
A7 (ON)  --  0.998  --  0.194  --  0.329  --  1.433
(2.571)  (1.275)  (1.889)  (2  OS0)
,1  4-1.41  --  -0.077  --  -0.351  -0.408  -
(-22.288)  (-0.348)  (-4.222)  (-8.988)
e2  1.222  --  0.610  --  0.197  --  0.235  -
(5.830)  (2.352)  (2.629)  (1.672)
0.76  0.95  0.97  0.9s  0.92  0.94  0.95  0.93
DV  2.54  1.83  1.86  1.60  1.64  1'.9  2.11  1.4C
Chi-squared  valuo
of  Weld teat  0.474  1.80  16.739  0.001
Level  of significance  0.491  0.180  0.001  0.97
a:  Equation  (3b).
b:  Equation  (3S)  .
Note:  numbers  in  parentheses  are  t-statistics.25
Table 2:  ESTIMATES OF THE UNSKILLED  WAGE EQUATION 1/
(Equation  5)
Argentina*  Colombia  Chile*  Uruguay
BO (Constant)  -. 0.187  -0.931  -1.129  -0.349
(-0.908)  (-1.075)  (-1.872)  (-0.403)
B1 (ln  p)  0.029  1.010  2.127  0.713
(0.081)  (0.839  (2.408)  (0.516)
B2 (ln  w)  0.717  0.693  0.347  1.341
(1.729)  (2.543)  (2.216)  (2.269)
B3 (ln  mw)  0.204  0.183  -0.263  -1.163
(0.906)  (1.481)  (-1.146)  (-1.780)
B4 (N)  0.207  0.044  -0.081  0.470
(1.098)  (0.770)  (-0.499)  (1.128)
R2  0.96  0.90  0.93  0.59
DW  2.7  1.6  2.5  1.3
1/  The sample  period is 1960-85  for  Argentina,  Chile, and  Colombia, and
1965-85 for Uruguay.
*  corrected for first-order autocorrelation.
Note:  Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.26
Table 3:  ESTIMATES OF THE PRICE EQUATION 1/
(Equation  7)
Argentina*  Colombia  Chile*  Uruguay
CO (Constant)  1.686  0.931  80.932  0.478
(2.390)  (15.018)  (0.734)  (17.910)
Cl (ln  w)  0.267  0.076  -0.059  0.262
(0.504)  (1.429)  (-0.866)  (3.564)
C2 (ln  mw)  0.121  0.014  0.106  0.070
(0.342)  (0.442)  (1.918)  (1.181)
C3 (ln  Wu)  -0.876  0.044  0.228  -0.005
(-1.144)  (0.586)  (2.175)  (-0.125)
C4 (ln  E/PT)  -0.183  0.079  0.060  0.191
(-1.961)  (1.583)  (1.993)  (9.133)
R2  0.93  0.96  0.94  0.98
DW  2.4  2.2  2.3  0.99
1!  The sample  period is 1960-85  for  Argentina,  Chile, and Colombia,  and
1965-85 for  Uruguay.
*  corrected for first-order  autocorrelation.
Notes:  Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.27
Table 4:  EFFECT OF DISTORTIONS IN THE FORMAL LABOR MARKET ON THE
RESPONSIVENESS OF THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE
TO DEVALUATION a/
At Mean Value
of the  Variables  At the 1986 Values
Argentina  -0.12  -0.14
Colombia  -0.06  -0.05
Chile  -0.58  -0.42
Uruguay  -0.76  -0.51
a/  Calculated using equation (8b).
Table 5:  EFFECT OF MINIMUM WAGES ON THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE b/
At Mean Value
of the  Variables  At the 1986 Values
Argentina  -0.33  -0.11
Colombia  0.04  0.15
Chile  0.10  0.09
Uruguay  0.28  0.32
b/  Calculated using equation (10).28
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Data  Appendix
The  macroeconomic  data  were obtained  from  standard  databases  available  at
the World Bank (ANDREX  and IFS).  The estimation  period is 1960-1985  for
Argentina,  Chile  and  Colombia,  and 1965-85  for  Uruguay (because  of a lack  of
adequate  information  on some labor  market  variables  for  the earlier  period).
The  price  series of  tradables and  nontradables  were  constructed  using
corresponding  price  deflators  taken  from  national  accounts. For  wage data,  we
used  the  country  studies  mentioned  below. The  skilled/unskilled  classification
was obtained  using  information  on schooling  years  and  job  characteristics  from
labor  force  surveys.  The  definition  of  unskilled  (informal)  workers  corresponds
to own account  workers  with less  than  eight  years  of  schooling;  for  Uruguay,
data  correspond  to employed  unskilled  labor  in general. The  variable  nonwage
labor  costs  includes  to  fringe  benefits,  social  security  contributions,  payroll
taxes,  and  bonuses  periodically  included  in  the  wage  bill. The  labor  force  and
minimum  wage  variables  come  from  official  government  statistics  reported  in  the
country  studies  mentioned  below.1 6/
Argentina: Sanchez,  C., and 0. Giordano. 'Exchange  Rate Policies  and the
Structure  of the  Labour  Market  in  Three  Latin  American  Countries,"
IIERAL-Fundacion  Mediterranea,  Cordoba,  January  1988.
Chile:  Paredes,  R.  'Trends  in Labour  Market  Variables  and  Macroeconomic
Adjustment  in  Chile,"  University  of  Chile,  Santiago,  February  1988.
Colombia:  Reyes,  A.  "Tendencias  del empleo  y la  distribucion  del ingreso,'
Bogota,  June,  1986.
Uruguay:  Ibarra,  A.M.,  "Politicas  Cambiarias  y la  Estructura  del  Mercado  del
Trabajo: Uruguay,"  Montevideo,  October  1988.
16/  The  World  Bank  hired  local  consultants  in  each  country  to  prepare  the  data
set  used  in  this  study. The  four  data  reports  are  available  upon  request.30
The  countries  included  in  this  study  are  at  relatively  similar  development
stages,  as suggested  by similar  life  expectancies  and  primary  school  enrollment
ratios. The  share  of  manufacturing  in  GDP --  a rough  indicator  of the  size  of
the  formal  sector  of the  economy  --  is also similar. There  is  more  variation
in per  capita  GDP,  but this  is due  more to perioao  of over  and  undervaluation
of the  dollar  than  to  differences  in  key economic  variables.
The four  countries  have used import-substitution  development  strategies
since  the  1940s,  although  Colombia  partially  abandoned  this  strategy  in  the  late
1960s  (World Bank 1984).  As  time passed, import substitution  created
progressively  greater macroeconomic  imbalances  without improving  wages or
employment  (Corbo  1986),  resulting  in considerable  government  intervention  in
goods and  factors markets.  The more  obvious cases of  this  increased
interventionism  occurred  in  Chile  in  1970-73  and  in  Argentina  in 1973-75.
Another  similarity  among  the  four  countries  is  their  tendency  to chronic
economic  instability.  In the period 1960-85,  these countries  experienced
fluctuating  GDP growth rates,  a varying  but normally  low .hare  of domestic
investment,  widely  fluctuating  real  exchange  rates  and persistent  inflation.
There  were also  some  differences  in  degree  of instability.  Colombia  does  not
have  a  history  of high  inflation  and  has  not  experienced  declines  in aggregate
economic  activity  or fiscal  imbalances  comparable  to those  in the  other  three
countries.  Argentina,  on the  other  hand,  had  by far  the  most  extreme  degree  of
economic  (as  well as  political)  instability.
During the 1970s, the four countries  tried to develop  more outward-
oriented  economies.  They also attempted  to reduce  the size of the public
sector,  thereby  eliminating  a source of inflation  and intervention  in the
economy.  This reform  effort  was notable in the Southern  Cone countries,
particularly  in  Chile. To  varying  extents  but  following  a similar  philosophy,31
these  countries  pursued  trade  liberalization,  market  deregulation,  and  financial
liberalization,  along  with  stabilization  programs  based  on  demand  management  and
the  use  of exchange  rate  policies  to reduce  inflation  (Edwards  and  Cox-Edwards
1988,  Corbo  and  de  Melo  1987). Despite  these  efforts,  overvaluation  of  the  real
exchange  rate,  persistent  fiscal  disequilibrium,  and  too  rapid  a relaxation  of
capital  account  restrictions  produced  unsustainable  trade  deficits  and  external
debt  burdens  (Barandiaran  1988).
In  1983-84,  the  reduction  in  domestic  expenditures  was substantial  in  all
the  countries  but  Colombia,  and  devaluations  played  a  key  role  in  the  adjustment
process.  Since then, the adjustment  process  has been slow and the four
countries experienced  varying degrees of  success.  Chile  and  Colombia
experienced  a  more sustained  recovery  than  Argentina  and  Uruguay.
The four  countries  also  share  some  common  labor  market  characteristics.
Government  intervention  in  wage  setting  is  important  in  all  four  countries. In
Chile  and  Argentina,  intervention  occurs  through  indexation  although  there  have
been  some  discontinuities  in  this  policy  in  Chile. In  Uruguay,  the  government
intervenes  in wage bargaining  carried out at the national level, thereby
influencing  the  wage structure  in  the  formal  sector. In  Colombia,  intervention
takes  place  mostly  through  nonwage  cost  regulations  (World  Bank  1985). In all
four countries,  wage intervention  is also accomplished  through  minimum  wage
policies.  While real minimum wages have declined in the Southern Cone
countries,  the  ratio  of  minimum  wage  to unskilled  wages  has  not,  and  this  is a
more relevant  indicator  of the  labor  market  role  of  minimum  wages.
Public  sector  employment  policies  have been used in these  countries  to
absorb  the  growth  in  the  labor  force  that  the  economy  is  unable  to  handle. The
proportion  of public  sector  employment  to total  employment  is similar  in the
three  Southern  Cone  countries. This  ratio  has  steadily  increased  over  time  in32
Colombia,  but  has recently  declined  in  the  other  countries.  That  public  sector
employment  has been used as a buffer  for the slow growth  of private sector
employment  is clearly  suggested  by the  growth  in  public  employment  in Uruguay
and  Argentina,  but  is less  marked  in  Colombia.PRE  Workino  Paper  Series
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